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Abstract
Is there any return to education in criminal activities? This is the first paper
that investigates whether education has not only a positive impact on legitimate,
but also on illegitimate activities. We use as a case study one of the longest running
criminal corporations in history: the Italian-American mafia. Its most successful
members have been capable businessmen, orchestrating crimes that require abilities
that might be learned at school: extracting the optimal rent when setting up a
racket, weighting interests against default risk when starting a loan sharking busi-
ness or organising supply chains, logistics and distribution when setting up a drug
dealing system. We address this question by comparing mobsters with their closest
(non-mobster) neighbors using United States Census data in 1940. We document
that mobsters have one year less education than their neighbors on average. None
of the specifications presented identified any significant difference in the returns to
education between these two groups. Private returns to education exist also in the
illegal activities characterised by a certain degree of complexity as in the case of
organized crime in mid-twentieth century United States.
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1 Introduction
Additional years of education are known to increase earnings in legitimate labor activities.
But what about illegal ones? In this study we will not discuss the activities of common
criminals. Our focus is professional criminals who belonged to one of the most successful
and long-lasting criminal organizations: the Italian-American mafia between the 1930s
and the 1960s. We match a list set up by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) of 723
mobsters belonging to the Italian-American mafia with the 1940 Census. This gives us
information about income, housing values, education, job characteristics, as well as the
precise address of residence. We match these mobsters with their white, male neighbors
of similar age who, we argue, are unlikely to be mafia associates.
Economists have shown that increased levels of education reduce criminal participa-
tion. This implies that education is likely to be more valued by legitimate firms than by
illegitimate ones. This is consistent with our first finding: mafia mobsters have on average
one less year of education when compared to their neighbors.
But this finding does not imply that returns to education are smaller for organized
crime members than for ordinary workers. Criminal careers are known to start very early
and are likely to be interwoven with schooling choices. Individuals who choose to be part
of the mafia are likely to trade off income and power for risk of injury, prison, and death.
This alone, without the need of lower returns to education, would predict a lower
investment in education as there would be fewer years of working life in which to recoup
foregone wages (Mincer, 1974). Indeed, economic theory predicts that individuals with
lower (working) life expectancy should have larger returns to education.
This is true unless the extra schooling is not marketable. So, is schooling marketable
in the mafia? This question is really about the mafia’s complex business model and about
the link between human capital and schooling. Let us start with the latter. If one takes
Bowles and Gintis (2002)’s view that schools “prepare people for adult work rules, by
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socializing people to function well (and without complaint) in the hierarchical structure
of the modern corporation” it would seem that schools are an ideal training environment
for aspiring mobsters.
While we do not embrace this view of schooling, many of the skills students acquire at
school are likely to be useful when setting up a racket (i.e. extracting the optimal rent),
a loan sharking business (i.e. weighting interests against default risks), a drug dealing
system (setting up supply chains), etc. It is ultimately an empirical question whether the
returns to education in the mafia are similar to the ones ordinary workers enjoy. This
comparison, we believe, is also informative about the workings of the mafia.
We estimate Mincer-type regressions using log income, log housing value, and log rent
as outcomes. The main variable of interest is years of education.
We find large returns to education within the mafia, no matter the model, or the
outcome variable, that we use. This shows that private returns to education exist not
only in legitimate but also in the illegitimate activities that imply a sufficient degree
of complexity. In Section 5 we discuss that the biases that are usually associated with
returns to education, ability bias and measurement error bias, would most likely reduce
such returns compared to the returns of the mobsters’ neighbors.
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic attempt to estimate the returns to
education in criminal activities and provides intuitive insights into the workings of complex
criminal gangs such as the mafia and into the factors considered by those deciding to
become criminals in the first place.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss the existing literature on education
and crime, before providing an overview of the history of mafia organizations and mem-
bers in the United States before 1960. We then present our novel dataset and empirical
methodology before finally presenting our results and conclusions.
3
2 Literature Review
This section discusses both the existing literature analyzing the impact of education on
crime and the recent and historical literature measuring the returns to education, provid-
ing context to the analysis presented below.
When modeling the decision of individuals to engage in crime, education has been
relatively neglected by economists as a channel that might influence both criminal pro-
ceeds and the incentive to enter the illegal labor market. And yet, Ehrlich (1975) suggests
that the relation between education and crime may be more complex, since it depends
on the way education affects the relative opportunities available to offenders in different
illegitimate activities. In his view education can be regarded as an instrument to improve
efficiency in the production in both legitimate as well as illegitimate markets, and we
should expect to find lower educated people committing petty crimes, and more educated
ones committing more elaborate crimes (e.g. fraud, forgery, embezzlement, trade in illegal
merchandise, and illegal commercial practices, etc). In addition, education may increase
an offender’s ability to avoid apprehension and punishment for their crimes.
Lack of individual data on criminal proceeds and education has prevented scholars
from analyzing the effect of education on the productivity of criminals.1 The only ex-
ception we are aware of is Carvalho and Soares (2013), a recent paper on 230 youngsters
working for drug-selling gangs in 34 poor neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro (so called fave-
las), Brazil. The authors have very detailed information on socioeconomic factors, like
years of schooling, literacy, wages related to drug dealing, involvement in violence, etc.
Their study is not focussed on estimating the returns to education but in their Mincer
wage regressions the coefficient of years of education is not significantly different from
zero. Instead, the coefficient on years of experience ranges between 5 and 10 percent.
1Moreover, the data typically used to study the relationship between criminal participation and edu-
cation is based on prison records. Inmates might not be a representative sample of all criminals, but just
a selection of the least able, thus underestimating the level of education of common offenders.
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But, drug selling in a Brazilian favela is likely to require a different set of skills com-
pared to many of the legal and illegal businesses that were run by the mafia in New York
and in other major US cities historically. The involvement of victims in racketeering,
extortions, and fraud adds an additional layer of complexity which is more common in
white-collar crimes. Moreover, many of these businesses were often run together, again,
adding complexity.2
Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) investigate the characteristics of members of a gang
located in an inner-city neighborhood in a large, industrial American city. They show
that gangsters’ average wages are only slightly higher than those of the legal sector, but
that the distribution of wages is highly skewed and is characterized by enormous wage
differentials between the gangsters at the bottom and those at the top of the criminal
organization. They interpret the decision to join a gang as a tournament, where the
winners will be highly compensated in terms of future wage. But they have no data on
the educational attainment of gangsters.
This paper also relates to the large literature estimating the private returns to edu-
cation more generally. For several decades, economists have been running Mincer regres-
sions similar in form to those we present and estimate below, variously using OLS, IV
and control function techniques to address estimation issues including ability bias and
measurement error. Recent investigations by Heckman et al. (2003) have found that the
Mincer specification, which assumes a linear relationship between log earnings and years
of education and a quadratic relationship between log earnings and experience, was most
appropriate for the period 1940-1950, which is reassuring for the results presented in this
paper and indicates that our estimates can reasonably be considered to represent the
internal rate of return to education.
Ashenfelter et al. (1999) provides a meta-analysis of 27 modern studies estimating
2On a related note, Lochner (2004) finds that education is associated with fewer property and violent
crimes but with more white collar crimes (although not significantly).
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the returns to schooling, focusing mainly on twin and sibling studies where estimates are
based on within-family variation, and on instrumental variables (IV) analyses. Returns
based on OLS estimation of Mincer-type regressions tend to average 6-7%, while using
IV or a twins sample yields estimates closer to 9% on average. Their method controls
for reporting bias whereby studies finding insignificant results tend to be underreported,
which may be a particular problem for IV and twin studies given their larger sampling
errors. Once they employ this approach, they conclude that the estimated returns to
schooling identified in the literature do not differ substantively due to differing estimation
strategies. This conclusion is reassuring for us, given that we are limited due to the nature
of our historical data in this study in terms of moving far beyond OLS estimations.
Card (2001) surveys the current state of the literature, focusing on IV approaches. He
points out that, even in studies using the most convincing instruments3, the interpretation
of the results must be as the average effect of education on earnings across individuals with
potentially heterogeneous returns to and costs of obtaining education and it also reflects
who was most affected by the instrument, which may not always be representative of the
returns to education of the average person in the population. Given that the returns may
be higher for those at lower levels of education and most IV strategies tend to exploit this
margin of exogeneity in attainment (the compulsory schooling and distance to educational
institutions studies for example) it is not so surprising that IV estimates tend to be larger.
This also suggests that producing baseline OLS estimates is still a useful exercise.
Finally, we discuss the smaller literature on education and estimates of its return in
pre-World War II United States. The historical literature on education has traditionally
focused on plotting the general trend of the rise of educational attainment and public
education in the United States.4 The general trend during the early twentieth century
3And there is evidence suggesting that some of those studies have used weak instruments, including
quarter of birth, which would bias the estimated coefficients towards OLS, (Card, 1999), p. 1837.
4See, for example the large body of work by Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, including Goldin and
Katz (2008b) and Goldin and Katz (2008a).
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was a steep upward trajectory in educational attainment associated with the “High School
Revolution”, with some states in New England and the midwest increasing attainment
faster than others. By 1940 half of U.S. youths had attained a high school diploma (Goldin
and Katz (2000), p. 786).
Lack of data on wages or income and on educational attainment before 1940 has held
back estimation of the returns to education for earlier dates. The earliest estimates come
from Goldin and Katz (2000), using the unique Iowa State Census of 1915, which provided
information on wages and education levels on a large group of individuals. They found
evidence of returns to a year of education as high as 9%, indicating that education was
valuable even in agricultural states, and they further show that returns to education in
Iowa fell from 1915 to 1940, with their estimates for the later date falling to around 6-7%
for that state.
Other historical studies have focused on testing the impacts that compulsory schooling
laws had on attainment and returns. Lleras-Muney (2002) used data from the 1960 Census
to look at the effect of labor and schooling laws on the educational attainment of those who
were aged 14 between 1915 and 1939. She finds that increasing the age at which a work
permit could be obtained or lowering the school entrance age increased attainment on
average by 5%. The main groups affected were those in the lower tail of the attainment
distribution. Furthermore, states with higher concentrations of immigrants tended to
pass more of these laws. These laws became better enforced from 1920 onwards, and have
been analyzed again more recently, along with English-language schooling requirements
in Lleras-Muney and Shertzer (2012), who focus on the effects on immigrants. They find a
modest increase in literacy in English among the foreign-born and show that compulsory
schooling laws had an effect on the foreign-born that was twice as big as that on natives,
looking at the period 1910-1930 (these two papers imply that child labor laws working
in conjunction with schooling laws were the key to explaining the closing gap between
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immigrant and native children’s attainment, and can explain about three quarters of the
increase in immigrant attainment overall, 1910-30). The average state’s laws implied a
minimum of 8 years of education for young working men in the 1940 Census.
Clay et al. (2012) look more comprehensively at compulsory schooling laws almost
from their first use in 1880 up to 1927. They look at men reporting positive wage income
in the 1940 Census and who were impacted by the laws of 1898-1927 and estimate returns
to a year of education of 8-9%, using OLS, and 11-14% using IV methods where the
compulsory schooling laws provide a plausible instrument. Our estimated returns for the
control group of neighbors, reported below, are therefore very much in line with existing
OLS estimates from the historical literature.
3 The Italian-American Mafia
This section provides some context regarding the Italian immigrant and Italian-American
population from the turn of the twentieth century onwards, which will inform our analyses
of rates of educational attainment and measured returns to schooling for these groups.
Around the time of the unification of Italy in 1861 the Sicilian economy as well as the
economy of the other southern Italian regions were highly dependent on four commodities:
citrus, grain, wine, and sulfur. Sicily was the world leader in the production of sulfur
and citrus, but around the turn of the twentieth century the price of these commodities
plummeted (Buonanno et al., forthcoming).
The most serious blow was the discovery of sulfur in America which was considerably
cheaper to extract. Moreover, the annexed south started to be heavily taxed under the
new Italian central government. As a consequence of these, and other, adverse shocks,
between 1901 and 1913 almost a quarter of Sicily’s population departed for the United
States. In that period around two million Italians, mainly from the South, emigrated to
the US (Critchley, 2009). This massive wave of migration stopped with the passage of
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the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924.
The majority of these immigrants had been agricultural workers, with low levels of
literacy. In Sicily children were expected to start working at an early age and schools
were seen as a threat to the family’s economic survival. In 1901 about 80 percent of the
Sicilian population was illiterate (ISTAT, 2014), and such rates were likely to be similar
among the negatively selected group of early immigrants (immigrants tend to be younger
and thus more literate but also poorer and thus less literate).
The early immigrants tended to be geographically clustered, with large numbers living
in little “Italies” and, as a group, they maintained their hostility to schooling. The
“Americanization” that might occur in American public schools was perceived as a threat
to their values. For example, Anthony Accardo, Chicago’s boss-of-bosses for almost a
half-century (who has a record in the Federal Bureau of Narcotics data), was born in
Chicago to a Sicilian-immigrant shoemaker and his Sicilian-immigrant wife. Both settled
in the U.S. in 1905. When Anthony was 14 his parents filed paperwork with the authorities
claiming that he was two years older than he actually was so that he could leave school
and go to work, a common practice in those days (Roemer, 1995). Later we will see that it
is precisely after eight years of schooling, when children are about 14, that the educational
gap between mafia members and their neighbors emerges.
Possibly also because of the educational gap, children of these early immigrants later
became street gang members in the slums, spoke little Italian, and worked side by side
with criminals from other ethnicities, mainly Jewish and Irish (Lupo, 2009). Several mafia
bosses, like Lucky Luciano, Tommaso Lucchese, Vito Genovese, Frank Costello, etc., were
children of these early immigrants. Criminal careers started quite early– Federal Bureau of
Narcotics records show that in fifty percent of cases the very first recorded arrest occurred
before the age of 20.
Lured by the criminal successes of the first wave of immigrants, and (paradoxically)
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facilitated by Prohibition, a nationwide constitutional ban on the sale, production, im-
portation, and transportation of alcoholic beverages that remained in place from 1920 to
1933, the second wave of immigrants that went on to become mafia bosses were already
criminals by the time they entered the United States. Charles Gambino, Joe Profaci and
others were in their 20s and 30s when they first entered the US, and most came from
Sicily. Another reason for this selection of immigrants was the 1920s fascist crack-down
of the mafia, which forced some of these criminals to leave Sicily.
After the second wave of immigration the Italian-American mafia became more closely
linked to the Sicilian mafia and started adopting its code of honor and tradition.5 In 1930
and 1931 these new arrivals sparked a mafia war, called the Castellammare war, named
after a small city in Sicily where many of the new mafia bosses came from. The war lasted
until Maranzano, who was trying to become the “boss of the bosses,” was killed, probably
by Lucky Luciano who had joined the Masseria Family.6 This war put Lucky Luciano
at the top of the mafia organization and there would be no more mafia wars during his
government. Lucky Luciano died of heart attack at the airport of Naples in 1962.
By 1940, the Census year we use to collect information about education, income,
housing value or rents of the mafia members listed in the 1960 FBN records, the mafia
had a well established government, called “commissione.” Joe Valachi, the first informant,
revealed that the mafia, the Cosa Nostra (“our thing”) was composed of approximately 25
Families. Cosa Nostra was governed by a Commissione of 7-12 bosses, which also acted
as the final arbiter on disputes between Families. The remaining 10 to 15 families were
smaller and not part of Cosa Nostra’s governing body. Each Family was structured in
hierarchies with a boss (Capo Famiglia) at the top, a second in command, called underboss
(Sottocapo), a counselor (Consigliere) and several captains (Caporegime) who headed a
5See Gosch and Hammer (1975).
6Before this event, in order to end the power-struggle between Masseria and Maranzano, Lucky Luciano
had offered to eliminate Joe “the Boss” Masseria, which he did at an Italian restaurant by poisoning
Masseria’s food with lead.
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group of soldiers (regime) (Maas, 1968).
These hierarchies allowed the mafia to successfully expand into a series of legal and
illegal activities. Mobsters were involved in racketeering,7 drug trafficking, gambling and
bootlegging, but also owned restaurants, drugstores or were otherwise involved in the food
sector. Real estate, casinos, car dealerships, loan-sharking and import-export were also
common businesses. According to the FBN files, by 1960 only 32 percent of gangsters
had no businesses, while 43 percent had one, 19 percent had two, and the remaining 5
percent had 3, 4, or 5 different businesses.
So, it seems clear that our sample mobsters represent career criminals engaged in
elaborate crimes requiring a complex hierarchy of individuals. Ferrante (2011), a former
member of the mafia associated with the Gambino family, describes these types as follows:
“If we shed our prejudices, we’ll find that accomplished mobsters are just
like top business leaders. The mafia shares the same power structure as any
corporation. A Don is exactly like a CEO, steering the business (or family)
into the future. His capos are middle-managers or department heads, and
his soldiers are employees. Whether corporate or mafia, people who acquire
diplomatic skills, leadership qualities, and the enthusiasm to motivate will
master their respective fields.”
4 Data
In this section we explain how the dataset was constructed. We searched for 723 members
of the Italian-American mafia whose details were listed in the 1960 Federal Bureau of
Narcotics (FBN) records.8
7Gambetta (1996) views the mafia as a protection agency that in exchange of a fee allows firms to
collude. Alexander (1997) shows evidence of such collusion practices in the 1930 Chicago Pasta market.
8In the 1930s and up to the 1950s the FBN, which later merged with the Bureau of Drug Abuse
Control to form the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, was the main authority in the fight
11
The records are an exact facsimile of the FBN secret files on American mafia members
who were active in 1960 (MAF, 2007).9
We then link these records based on a multitude of variables (name, surname, names
of family members, the residence address, the year of birth, arrests, etc.) by hand to the
1940 Decennial Census using the genealogical website ancestry.com. We face two selection
problems. We can only match mobsters who survived up to 1960 and we can only gather
information on incomes and/or housing outcomes when the mobsters are not in prison at
the time of the Census.
Since between 1940 and 1960 mafia Families were not at war with each other, the
second selection is likely to be more serious. Thirty-two mobsters out of 414 (7.7 percent)
were in prison. One would expect the more “executive” members of the mafia, the soldiers,
to be more likely to face the risks of prison or death. We have information of education
for those spending time in prison, and these mobsters do indeed have on average lower
levels of education compared to the ones that are out of prison (6.8 versus 7.7).
Including the 32 inmates by imputing their incomes or housing values has little in-
fluence on the estimated returns to education but we need to keep in mind that this
robustness test cannot be performed for the members who died between 1940 and 1960.10
Our search achieved a high match rate of almost 57%, matching 414 individuals to their
Census record. This compares favorably with match rates from other studies searching
for individuals in historical Censuses using ancestry.com– our relative success is likely
attributed to the amount of information in the FBN records that we could match to the
Census. Using broadly similar search criteria, Collins and Wanamaker (2013) obtain a
21% match rate when searching for African-American men between the 1910 and 1930
against the mafia (Critchley, 2009). The New York Federal Bureau of Investigation had just a handful
of agents assigned to the mafia, while in the same office more than 400 agents were fighting domestic
communists (Maas, 1968).
9The distribution of the year of first arrest of mobsters has almost full support within the range
1908-1960, so one can infer that the data refer to what the authorities knew in 1960.
10The results are available upon request.
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U.S. Censuses, while Abramitzky et al. (2014) report a 19% match rate when connecting
more than 1 census between 1900 and 1920.
We collected information about mafiosi and their closest neighbors, defined as all
individuals recorded on the same page in the 1940 Census manuscript. The advantage
of the 1940 Census is that it allows for a search by first and last names as well as basic
demographic characteristics and it was the first U.S. Census to ask questions about highest
grade of schooling attained, wage income, whether any non-labor income was earned in the
previous year, migration in the past five years at the individual level and it also provides
information on the house value or rent paid for each household. The resulting database on
each mobster spans their criminal careers and early life history and background, as well
as comparable measures of background for a group of their neighbors. We cleaned the
data of typographic errors present on the ancestry.com website, to ensure a large enough
sample size for the analyses below. The 1940 Census was only released to the public with
names in 2012 and the FBN records were declassified and published in 2007, so this is
the first time that such a dataset linking members of organized crime families and their
illegal behaviors to earlier information on educational attainment and family background
has been possible. Mastrobuoni (forthcoming) provides more detail on the FBN source,
but it contains information about approximately one quarter of mafia members in the
1960s.
While some of the neighbors might have been associated with the mafia, most were
probably not. Of our 414 mobsters only in 5 instances did mobsters with different sur-
names share the same Census page with other mobsters: Joseph Filardo and Joseph
Cusamano, Carlo Gambino and Gaetano Russo, Joseph Stracci and John Linardi, Agatino
Garufi and Salvatore Maimone, Vincent Teriaca and Nicholas Bonina. In other words,
only 10 out of 414 known mobsters lived close enough to end up on the same Census page.
Moreover, some of the differences in the characteristics of mobsters and neighbors
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suggest that neighbors are indeed less likely to be mobsters. We will see that neighbors
are considerably less likely to be born in Italy (15 percent against 38 percent), they are
also less likely to be employers or to be working on own account (12.95 percent against
31.14 percent) and twice as likely to be working in the government (9.92 percent against
4.72 percent). We will also see that they are less likely to underreport their income.
Here is how we selected mobsters and neighbors. Each mobster who, in that year,
was not spending time in prison (32 out of 414 were incarcerated), was not attending
school (45 out of 382 were still in school), and whose age was above 18 (6 out of 334 were
minors) was then matched one to many with their white male neighbors selected as above
and whose age is within 10 years of the mobster’s age (we are also going to use lower
thresholds). The average number of records on each Census page (independently of race,
gender and age) is 32.5 and never exceeds 40. In ninety percent of cases there are more
than 25 such records. After the selection of mobsters and neighbors the average number
of neighbors is equal to 6.2.
This gives us a final sample of 318 mobsters and a comparable set of their peers, based
on age, race, gender and place of residence, on which to run our analysis of the returns to
education for criminals versus non-criminals. We firstly discuss summary characteristics
of the sample before proceeding with our main analyses. We also acknowledge that we are
running straightforward Mincer regressions using OLS but, given that our data collection
strategy allows us to observe mobsters and neighbors, in Section 5 we argue that the
usually cited biases of such an approach should be present for both groups equally, allowing
us to compare outcomes for the two.
4.1 Summary Statistics
In the analyses neighbors are always weighted by the inverse of their number ωi = 1/ni,
where the index i identifies mobsters. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for mobsters
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and the matched neighbors.
Mobsters are considerably more likely to report no income, and the ones they report
are on average 20 percent lower than for the matched neighbors. This is likely to be
misreporting because it is incompatible with the value of the house where they live.
Mobsters are more likely to own a house (33 percent vs. 31 percent), and their house is
on average worth about 10 percent more compared to those of their neighbors. Moreover,
even mobsters who are renting tend to spend 6 percent more than their closest matches.
Since underreporting might bias our results we will conduct our analysis considering
income, the value of their house and their monthly rent payments, as three different
measures of their economic status.
Yet, the observed differences in education might be part of the story. Mobsters have
on average one less year of education compared to their neighbors: 7.79 against 8.71.11
In line with the anecdotal evidence mentioned before, Figure 2 shows that the difference
is mainly driven by differences past secondary education, when children are about 14.
In terms of other socioeconomic characteristics, mobsters are more likely to be for-
eigners (30 percent are aliens, while 25 percent have been naturalized compared to 21
percent and 18 percent respectively for the group of neighbors), and are more likely to
have been born in Italy. They are more likely to be married but they have, on average,
fewer children and smaller households. Geographic mobility is low for both groups: 85%
of both mobsters and their neighbors have lived in the same house for at least five years.
Now that we have introduced the data sources and some summary statistics for our
sample of mobsters and neighbors, the following sections will outline our methodology and
results, facilitating a comparison of the returns to education in legitimate and illegimate
activities.
11As a benchmark, the average years of education for U.S. males aged 25-59 from the 1940 Census as
a whole was approximately 8.6 years (Goldin and Katz (2000), p. 790).
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5 Counterfactuals, Returns to Education, and Re-
turns to Experience
In order to establish the role that education plays in shaping earnings inside organized
crime organizations we follow the long tradition of Mincer-type regressions.
These regressions are known to suffer from two main biases: measurement error bias
and ability bias. The first refers to the fact that years of education might be measured
with error. Since we do not use instruments it is important to address how these biases
are likely to differentially influence estimates of the returns to education for mobsters and
neighbors.
While we cannot assess the measurement error in education, we show that incomes
are measured with more error among mobsters.
Mobsters are more likely to report incomes of zero (this is partly due to the fact that
the 1940 Census did not require the self-employed to report their wage/salary income,
and mobsters are more likely to be self-employed) and more likely to report low incomes
compared to the value of their house or their rent. Given that a large part of mobsters’ in-
comes are based on illegal activities this is not surprising. If similar misreporting happens
with respect to education, returns to education would be biased towards zero.
If mobsters were more likely to misreport not just income but also education the,
measurement error bias would be more severe among mobsters than among neighbors.
The ability bias is larger when the correlation between ability and education and the
correlation between ability and income is stronger. Since mobsters are more likely to drop
out of school for a series of reasons that are not related to ability (i.e. incarceration, but
also cultural preferences. Later we will discuss historical evidence that Italian immigrant
parents were forcing children to drop out of school at the age 14) the first correlation
is likely to be weaker among mobsters than among their neighbors. As for the second
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correlation it is hard to say, but it would be difficult to make up a story where such
abilities mattered more inside the mafia and at the same time more at school.
Summarizing the discussion, we believe the test of a negative difference between the
returns to education in organized crime and those in the legal labor market to be a
conservative one. And yet, we will see that such differences are estimated to be close to
zero.
As is customary we transform all outcomes into logarithms (later we use alternative
approaches to deal with zero incomes).
There is an additional advantage of taking logarithms: if mobsters are only reporting a
fraction of their income µYi, in logarithms this fraction will be separated from the outcome
log µi + log Yi = αi + yi and can be captured by the constant term. Taking logarithms we
exclude all incomes that are zero. We will show that this is likely to improve the precision
of the estimates as zero incomes do not appear to be genuinely zero but are rather driven
by misreporting.
The economic outcomes ymi (income, housing value, and rent) of mobsters (m = 1) and
neighbors (m = 0) can be decomposed as a function of observables wmi = (s
m
i , a
m
i , x
m
i ),
respectively education, age, and other observable characteristics, and unobservables θm =
(αm, δm, γm, βm), respectively constant terms (including underreporting), returns to edu-
cation, returns to experience (age), and returns from other observable characteristics.
Thus, in the most general terms we have that ymi = f (w
m
i , θ
m). Before adding more
structure to f (·), we construct counterfactuals based on the propensity score Pr (m = 1) =
Φ (w′iζ).
Following Abadie (2005), we weight observations by the (inverse) propensity score of
assignment–i.e. the probability of belonging to each group, conditional upon the observed
covariates. Specifically, the weight attached to each observation is:
mi + (1−mi) 1−pp
Φ(w′iζ)
1−Φ(w′iζ)
(multiplied by ωi), where, p is the unconditional probabil-
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ity of being a mobster. When weighting we can construct the following counterfactual
y˜0i = f (w
1
i , θ
m), that is the outcome of neighbors if they had the same observable char-
acteristics of mobsters. The difference y1i − y˜0i = f (w1i , θ1) − f (w1i , θ0) measures the
importance of unobservable characteristics, while y˜0i − y0i = f (w1i , θ0) − f (w0i , θ0) mea-
sures the importance of observable characteristics.
Adding these two terms together one obtains the original differences between the
outcomes of mobsters and neighbors.12
We estimate the propensity score using a probit regression for the probability of being
a mobster, conditional on all the observable characteristics listed in Table 1. The results
are shown in Table 2. Education is associated with a lower probability of becoming a
mobster and so is age. Being born in Italy is a strong predictor of becoming a mobster.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the propensity score for the two groups. While
the density for the mobsters is significantly shifted toward a probability of one, the two
densities do overlap, meaning that for almost all propensities scores one can find mobsters
as well as neighbors.
Using the propensity score we build the counterfactual distributions of neighbors if
they had the same observable characteristics of mobsters. These counterfactuals are
presented in Figures 3 to 5, together with the cumulative distributions of log income, log
housing value, and log rent of mobsters and neighbors.
The raw plots for mobsters and neighbors show that mobsters’ reported log income is
typically lower than the log income of neighbors. The opposite is true when looking at
housing values or rents. This is likely driven by income being underreported.
If observable characteristics were able to explain these differences between mobsters
and neighbors, the counterfactual distribution of neighbors would lie on top of the one
of mobsters. If anything, observable characteristics accentuate the differences. Neighbors
12One important advantage of propensity score weighting, relative to other matching estimators, is
the possibility of computing asymptotically valid standard errors by bootstrapping methods (Abadie and
Imbens, 2008).
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with the observable characteristics of mobsters would earn the same income they already
earn when incomes are below the median. But for incomes above the median they would
actually earn even less than mobsters.
This is even more true when looking at housing values and rents. Despite the lower
reported incomes mobsters live in more expensive housing and pay higher rents. If neigh-
bors had the same characteristics of mobsters, for example lower education, they would
live in even less expensive housing arrangements.
Next we try to measure the returns to education for mobsters and neighbors. In order
to estimate such returns it is customary to add more structure to f(·). We follow the long
tradition of Mincer regressions and use linear models, where the log of y is regressed on
years of education and age. 13
The Mincer regressions for the two groups are:
log ymi = α
m + θmwmi + 
m
i .
Similarly to the counterfactual regressions, differences in y can be decomposed as
follows:
∆ log yi = ∆α + ∆θw
1
i + θ
0∆wi + ∆i, (1)
where ∆zi = z
1
i − z0i .
Due to lack of direct evidence on workplace experience, in all Mincer wage regressions
we control for age as opposed to experience. While experience is often proxied by age
minus the years of education, in our data a non-negligible fraction of individuals have
very few years of education (12 percent have less than 4 years of education). In order
13Heckman et al. (2003) use Census data for the period 1940-1990 to estimate flexible internal rates of
return to schooling. They account for non linearity in schooling, non-separability between schooling and
work experience, etc. While they do find evidence of such non-linearities, the 1940 and 1950 Censuses
provide support for Mincer’s original, more basic, model.
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to compute the return to education keeping experience rather than age constant it is
sufficient to add the returns to age to the returns to education.
The results for the Mincer regressions of income when controlling only for age and years
of education are in Column 1 and 5 of Table 4 for mobsters and neighbors. The returns
to education and to experience are equal to about 7 and 4 percent, and do not differ for
the two groups. This result does not change when controlling for a set of socioeconomic
factors (columns 2 and 6), for state fixed effects (columns 3 and 7), and for city fixed
effects (columns 4 and 8). The robustness table 5 shows that the results differ little when
controlling for a squared term of age (Column 2), for log of total working hours per year
(a variable that is not always available), and when limiting the sample to neighbors whose
age gap with mobsters is under 5 years (and not 10 as in the baseline). The results are
also robust to focussing on individuals above age 22, an age at which individuals in the
1940s had usually completed their studies. The returns to education for mobsters stop
being significant when using a Poisson model, i.e. when including incomes of zero. This is
consistent with the observed misreporting of zero income. Mobsters who report incomes
of zero have on average higher levels of education, and live in more valuable housing. The
opposite is true for neighbors.
Since income is subject to these biases, we also estimate Mincer regressions using
housing outcomes of head of households as dependent variables. Housing outcomes might
be an alternative, possibly less distorted, proxy for long-term income or wealth. Table 6
shows that even when using housing outcomes the returns to education and experience
are quite comparable for the two groups. If anything, the returns to education seem to
be larger for mobsters than for neighbors.
That the differences between the returns to education are not significantly different
from each other can be seen when performing the Oaxaca decomposition of Equation 1.
Table 7 decomposes the differences between mobsters and neighbors in explained (∆w)
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and unexplained (∆θ) differences.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the link between education and economic outcomes (income, housing
values and housing rents) among members of the Italian-American Mafia and among their
neighbors. We focus on mobsters who were listed in a 1960 Federal Bureau of Narcotics
publication and link these data with those of the 1940 Decennial Census.
Consistent with a career choice model, we find that the distribution of years of edu-
cation of mobsters is statistically dominated by the distribution of their neighbors. We
also find that schooling has a positive return not only in legitimate activities, but also
in illegitimate ones. While this might appear counterintuitive, a model of human capital
investment where the working life (in this case because of expected prison time, injuries
or death) is shorter, predicts larger returns to education.
This rests on the assumption that education either signals productivity or contributes
to the productivity of mobsters.
The mafia business is usually a mix of legal and illegal activities. For illegal activities
like racketeering, extortion, loan sharking, etc. skills acquired in education, like the
ability to process numbers, to think logically, etc. might indeed increase with education
and be necessary for success in these mafia roles. Moreover, often times loan sharking
would allow mobsters to acquire legitimate businesses which would also be convenient for
money-laundering purposes. Returns to education in such activities are likely to be large
too.
We conclude that, at least for career criminals operating at a high level in complex
organizations who perpetrate serious crimes, education is quite valuable.
This study has focused on a very specific organized crime group, the mafia. Whether
these results hold up in other criminal organizations, with more or less complex business
21
models, is a possible avenue of future research.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Mafia Mobsters Neighbors
Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N
Income 817 1,164 292 1,067 1,178 1783
Zero income 0.38 0.49 292 0.23 0.42 1783
Head of HH 0.67 0.47 318 0.58 0.49 1973
Home owner 0.33 0.47 318 0.31 0.46 1973
House value 7,336 10,188 104 6,648 10,314 533
Rent 35.74 25.29 201 33.71 27.67 1272
Yrs. of education 7.79 3.08 318 8.71 3.71 1973
Age in years 33.77 8.44 318 34.11 9.76 1973
Married 0.72 0.45 318 0.63 0.48 1973
Born in Italy 0.38 0.49 318 0.15 0.36 1973
Alien citizen 0.30 0.46 318 0.21 0.41 1973
Naturalized citizen 0.25 0.43 318 0.18 0.39 1973
# of HH members 2.84 2.15 318 3.38 2.03 1973
# of children 0.50 1.02 318 0.75 1.21 1973
Same residence last 5yrs. 0.84 0.37 318 0.85 0.36 1973
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Table 2: Propensity Score Probit
(1) (2)
P(mobster=1)
Coeff. Marginal
Yrs. of education -0.033*** -0.013***
(0.011) (0.004)
Age in years -0.029*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.002)
Married 0.271*** 0.108***
(0.090) (0.035)
Born in Italy 1.243*** 0.448***
(0.123) (0.037)
Alien citizen -0.564*** -0.220***
(0.188) (0.070)
Naturalized citizen 0.142 0.057
(0.175) (0.070)
# of HH members -0.045 -0.018
(0.029) (0.012)
# of children -0.109** -0.044**
(0.055) (0.022)
Same residence last 5 yrs. -0.005 -0.002
(0.090) (0.036)
Constant 1.067***
(0.191)
Observations 3946 3946
log-likelihood -396.5
Notes: propensity score with clustered (by mobster)
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3: Correlations Between Measures of Wealth
and Income
(log) House value (log) Rent
Whole Sample
Mobster Income 0.267 0.234
Mobster log-Income 0.514 0.340
Neigh. Income 0.291 0.397
Neigh. log-Income 0.334 0.435
Heads of Household
Mobster Income 0.280 0.236
Mobster log-Income 0.641 0.441
Neigh. Income 0.512 0.433
Neigh. log-Income 0.452 0.552
Notes: Correlation coefficients
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Table 4: Mincer Regressions Using Yearly Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log-Income of Mafia members log-Income of Neighbors
Yrs. of education 0.072*** 0.068** 0.061** 0.063** 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.074***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Age in years 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.037** 0.033** 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Married 0.219 0.174 0.232 0.483*** 0.469*** 0.463***
(0.164) (0.160) (0.188) (0.075) (0.071) (0.066)
Born in Italy -0.478 -0.614 -0.878 -0.040 -0.056 -0.043
(0.378) (0.393) (0.564) (0.107) (0.103) (0.103)
Alien citizen 0.912** 1.146** 1.339* -0.062 -0.085 -0.041
(0.457) (0.469) (0.704) (0.102) (0.102) (0.108)
Naturalized citizen -0.672** -0.775*** -0.773** 0.037 0.055 0.016
(0.281) (0.282) (0.346) (0.106) (0.107) (0.116)
# of HH members -0.090 -0.141** -0.186** -0.008 -0.021 -0.027
(0.067) (0.070) (0.083) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
# of children 0.161 0.232* 0.352** -0.028 -0.010 0.003
(0.133) (0.132) (0.161) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Same residence last 5 yrs. -0.049 0.030 0.080 0.072 0.057 0.013
(0.214) (0.200) (0.289) (0.089) (0.082) (0.085)
Constant 4.716*** 4.909*** 5.225*** 5.369*** 4.844*** 4.898*** 4.976*** 5.027***
(0.578) (0.762) (0.752) (0.857) (0.161) (0.205) (0.193) (0.208)
State fixed effects Y Y
City fixed effects Y Y
Observations 1143 1143 1143 1143 1381 1381 1381 1381
R-squared 0.096 0.148 0.268 0.471 0.206 0.265 0.298 0.383
Notes: There are a total of 318 mobsters in the data. The number of observations refer to the
unweighted data. Weighting there are 318 observations in both groups. Mincer wage regressions with
clustered (by mobster) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Robustness Mincer Wage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log-Income
Panel A: Mafia Members Baseline w. Age sq. w. Tot.Hrs. ∆age ≤ 5 age ≥ 22 Poisson
Mafia yrs. educ. 0.068** 0.065** 0.061*** 0.092*** 0.056** 0.045
(0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029)
Age in years 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.024* 0.058*** 0.039** 0.032**
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
Age squared -0.002
(0.002)
log-Total hours worked 0.798***
(0.134)
Observations 1,143 1,143 779 684 1,071 1,788
R-squared 0.148 0.161 0.507 0.227 0.113
log-likelihood -183081
Panel B: Neighbors Baseline w. Age sq. w. Tot.Hrs. ∆age ≤ 5 age ≥ 22 Poisson
Neighbors yrs. educ. 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.062*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.072***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Age in years 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.022*** 0.038*** 0.022*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Age squared -0.002***
(0.000)
log-Total hours worked 0.558***
(0.057)
Observations 1,381 1,381 1,124 814 1,279 1,783
R-squared 0.265 0.294 0.411 0.272 0.202
log-likelihood -140536
Notes: There are a total of 318 mobsters in the data. The number of observations refer to the
unweighted data. Weighting there are 318 observations in both groups. Mincer wage regressions with
clustered (by mobster) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Mincer Regressions Using House Values and Monthly
Rents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia members Neighbors
Home- House- Rent Home- House- Rent
owner value owner value
Yrs. of education 0.020 0.086* 0.050*** 0.034** 0.059** 0.051***
(0.030) (0.045) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.009)
Age in years 0.088*** 0.044** 0.027** 0.054*** 0.002 0.020***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005)
Other Xs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,228 341 876 1,080 252 811
R-squared . 0.154 0.136 . 0.155 0.167
log-likelihood -109.6 -95.77
Notes: There are a total of 318 mobsters in the data. The number of
observations refer to the unweighted data. Weighting there are 318
observations in both groups. Mincer wage regressions with clustered (by
mobster) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 7: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Differential in log-Income log-Housevalue log-Rent
Neighbors’ Xb 6.91 0.04 8.31 0.10 3.37 0.04
Mobsters’ Xb 6.75 0.08 8.51 0.14 3.42 0.05
Difference 0.16 0.08 -0.20 0.14 -0.04 0.04
Explained difference between Neighbors and Mobsters: ∆w
Yrs. of education 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.02
Age in years 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Married -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.01
Born in Italy 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.02
Alien citizen 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.11 0.00 0.00
Naturalized citizen 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.01
# of HH members 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
# of children -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.01
Same residence last 5 yrs. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 0.09 0.03 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.03
Unexplained difference between Neighbors and Mobsters: ∆θ
Yrs. of education 0.06 0.22 -0.12 0.30 -0.01 0.14
Age in years -0.46 0.49 -1.12 0.86 -0.29 0.32
Married 0.19 0.12 -0.32 0.44 -0.53 0.16
Born in Italy 0.14 0.12 -0.01 0.27 0.02 0.07
Alien citizen -0.26 0.13 -0.05 0.32 -0.04 0.06
Naturalized citizen 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.25 0.05 0.05
# of HH members 0.22 0.18 0.68 0.32 0.15 0.12
# of children -0.08 0.06 -0.31 0.18 -0.08 0.04
Same residence last 5 yrs. 0.10 0.18 -0.15 0.52 -0.04 0.10
Constant -0.01 0.74 0.96 1.39 0.66 0.40
Total 0.07 0.08 -0.35 0.19 -0.10 0.04
Number of obs. 2,524 689 1,739
Notes: Clustered (by mobster) standard errors
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